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The Many Bubble Interpretation, externalism, the extended mind of 
David Chalmers and Andy Clark, and the work of Alva Noe in 
connection with Experimental Philosophy and Dreamwork
Abstract
The idea of dreams being mere internal artifacts of the mind does not seem to be essential to 
externalism and extended mind theories, which seem as if they would function as well without 
this additional assumption. The Many Bubble Interpretation could allow a simpler rationale to 
externalist theories, which may be even simpler if the assumption that dreams have no 
worthwhile content outside the mind is omitted.
Almost everybody agrees that mind and world are causally coupled (Prinz, 2009).
In normal perception we don't have the problem of stabilising detail. Noe (2009) points out - and 
in that follows the point made by LaBerge and many others - that if a dreamer looks more than 
once at, say, a printed sign in a dream the sign is likely to say something different on second 
viewing (apparently always in LaBerge's experience). The sign's content may even change 
whilst it is being watched. It often does in my experience of dreamwork. In general terms I have 
found that recorded results of dream experiments are more consistent over a series of 
experiments involving many different dreamers, than some experiments in the waking world 
which could be expected to be much more easily quantifiable and even more easily measurable 
(Yates, 2008). Synaesthesia is one example. That is to say with dreamwork we are left with a 
pile of reasonably consistent data to consider, even though the data itself may be construed as 
irrationally produced or even arising from a random source. Others such as Domhoff seem to 
confirm this. 
But, even though dream results are in some way scientifically collatable, there is still the 
problem with instability of detail within individual dreams. For example, it is not like measuring 
UV spectra, when the same pure substance should give the same results each time. Now 
variability is not too unusual in psychology experiments, but clearly this level of variability is well 
beyond the norm.
Noe interprets this as meaning that dreams are not real, in the sense that waking experience is 
real, though he admits that the perceptual experience of dreaming is real. He then reasonably 
says that this implies that waking experience is different to dreaming experience, and that 
dreams cannot be construed as evidence in effect that reality is just another dream.
Yes, we can go this far. Andy Clark and Chalmers also seem largely to admit this view. In 
principle for day to day working purposes we can accept such an idea but we would use 
Ockham's razor yet again to say that it does not mean, either, that dreams necessarily consist 
ONLY of results from within the brain. In a way Noe would betray the thread of his own 
argument if he took the view that dreams necessarily consist only of results from within the 
brain, as he is very much into Merleau-Ponty type externalism.
In other words, if we accept Noe's variety of externalism in principle, we should leave it as open 
ground that dreams may come not just from a simple B-series 3+1 dimensional lump of white 
and grey neural matter. In fact our own position involves the A-series as well, where 
externalism, we trust, provides less of a problem. (Yates, 2008, 2008a, 2008b).
So such a position should be arguable and indeed essential at least in principle with Noe.
And in fact the mental status of dreams is still not clearly known, and there is no need for 
dreams to be purely internal in origin to allow most of Clark's argumentation. 
Of course anyone who seems to claim entirely the unfortunate implied position that we only 
need consider what goes on in the brain to understand how the brain operates in the world, 
probably can be dealt with using a slightly different paradigm, not the topic of the present note.
The position of both Andy Clark and of David Chalmers seems to differ quite substantially from 
that of Noe. Although they both seem to favor augmented extensions of the simple B-series 3+1 
dimensional lump of white and grey neural matter, it is sometimes difficult to visualise a 
satisfactory precise detailed formulation of that idea. Without a clear A series somewhere, 
instinct tends to make one fall back to Fodor's position.
With the A series on board, things differ dramatically. Purely to illustrate this point in another 
quite different case, if we consider Butterfield's (2001) critique of Barbour's work (Part 3.1), we 
realise that the moment McTaggart's paradox is invoked, the situation changes drastically.
It looks to me that Andy Clark is apparently activating the Foundation Argument against dreams, 
according to his correspondence with Noe (2009) at least. This seems to be a needlessly blunt 
edged sword to establish his views. The idea that consciousness depends only (or mainly) on 
what is happening in the brain the brain would take him away from the more extreme stance of 
Noe. And the Foundation Argument idea seems quite unproven anyway. It is essentially close to 
the idea of Crick. Noe gives quite cogent reasons against that, which may not concern the 
present argument. It really hardly matters to Clark's main argument that he should also apply it 
against dreams if he applies it to a lot of other things too. In other words, Clark's occasional 
comments that "dreams" seem to constitute almost purely cranial/neural matters do not really 
seem to be a clincher to his argument, but incidental ideas.
And as I just pointed out, we can look at even more unfortunate paradigms elsewhere. To put it 
largely, arguments against solipsism and generally accepted brute fact can come into such a 
discussion, except in specialised areas of mind science. There we are talking of Churchland as 
well as Crick and Searle, and our own working argumentation would be presented differently in 
such a case.
So it is perhaps simplest to look at the views of Fodor (2009) and Chalmers (2009). Fodor is 
claiming that Clark is effectively using the slippery slope argument between Otto and Inga, and 
also that notebooks are not the same as minds. Now that, apart from intentionality factors, does 
seem to be the case.
I'm not sure of the dispositional claims of Chalmers. Obviously Chalmers seems maybe to 
eventually want  to solve a problem which Noe refers to on the first page of his preface "Only 
one proposition about how the brain makes us conscious . . . has emerged unchallenged: we 
don't have a clue." The Chalmers solution could presumably involve yet more machines, and 
Fodor presumably would not quite take that line.
I think here we are left with different levels of implied logic. Noe's approach could be construed 
as a sophisticated "ad hominem" level argument, briefly to the effect that everyone knows that 
the world exists in the way most people think it does (for example, in no sense is it anything 
resembling the Matrix). That is somewhat in the sort of way that some have said Dr. Johnson 
tried to refute Bishop Berkeley, by kicking a stone and saying "I refute it thus". The problem is of 
course not just time constraints but more importantly constraints as to apparently available 
accurate scientific knowledge about situation and circumstances. In the context of 
neurophysiology and consciousness research generally we frequently seem to be deep into the 
area of informal logic (Groarke, 2008, 1999). Of course Noe has written a lot to expand and 
rephrase his arguments and to include a great detail of neurophysiological detail, and that is 
indeed of great value to his comments, and that fact must be remembered. 
But in the case of Clark and Chalmers I am left feeling that they are looking for more of a logical 
commitment (Groarke (1999), Walton, (2002)). The most recent post of Chalmers (2009) 
suggests that it has not got there yet, but my thinking is that the sort of overall approach that 
Mandik (2009) has used, where he actually goes so far as to question the current idea of 
representation, is perhaps more relevant. Details in Mandik's case are sketched out by others in 
Mandik (2009a).
Whether there is an appropriate formalism is not the point here, as dreams is our current topic in 
this note. But it is possible to point out that it is only if the brain is considered as a simple B-
series 3+1 dimensional lump of white and grey neural matter that worries about externalism 
overawe us so much. In the Many Bubble Interpretation (Yates, 2008, 2008a, 2008b) the 
relationship comes out naturally. Simple mathematics is not there in detail yet but so far all 
seems straightforward.
To look briefly forward, purely for a simple modus operandi in experimental philosophy, I 
consider that Knobe's (2009) style of approach may be better than a lot of mathematics before 
we can contrive more parameter values.
                                               ---------------------------------------
Conclusion
It cannot be assumed that dreams are of necessity simply part of a simple internal mental 
continuum.
The Many Bubble Interpretation could allow a simpler rationale to externalist theories, which 
may be even simpler if the assumption that dreams have no worthwhile content outside the 
mind is omitted.
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